gone a quite significant transformation, away from a predominantly state interventionist approach to one shaped much more by the precepts of neoliberalism.
How can we understand the shift in Labor's economic policy since the 1960s? One common interpretation has been to suggest that Labor has betrayed the reformist promise of its earlier decades during which it sought to use economic policy as a lever to improve conditions for the working class (Jaensch,1989) . The betrayal thesis suggests that Labor turned its back on its reformist past and embraced a full-blown pro-capitalist agenda of 'economic rationalism', i.e. neo-liberalism, during the 1970s or under Bob Hawke's and Paul Keating's Governments, between 1983 and 1996 . This thesis can be contrasted with Kevin Rudd's account of social democratic continuity in Australian Labor Party (ALP) policy. Rudd, Prime Minister from November 2007 until June 2010, suggested that Labor has pursued a consistent approach, marked by a commitment to fairness and equality of opportunity, achieved through a mixture of market mechanisms and state action (Rudd, 1998) .
The problem with the betrayal thesis is that it exaggerates the break in Labor's economic policies. It conveniently glosses over important features of ALP's record in office prior to the 1960s -most obviously the behaviour of the Scullin Government during the Great Depression. On the other hand, Rudd's attempt to identify a golden thread of genuine devotion to the interests of the working class, cannot explain major shifts in economic and in-dustrial relations policy, some of which evidently had nothing to do with promoting fairness.
There is an alternative interpretation that explains shifts in Labor's economic policies as consequences of the party's material constitution, its character as a capitalist workers party, in changing circumstances. When understood in this way, the logic of the ALP's differentiation from and convergence with the conservative parties become clearer. The main focus in the following discussion is on three aspects of economic policy under the Gough Whitlam (1972-75) , Hawke (1983-91) , Keating (1991-96) , Rudd (2007-10) and Julia Gillard (2010-) Governments: their contribution to the restructuring of Australian capitalism, both internally and in relations with international rivals; their efforts to raise the rate of exploitation of the Australian working class, mediated through relations with trade union leaders; and their approaches to macro-economic policy. In contrast with Kevin Rudd's account, we argue that commitment to sustaining the profitability of Australian capitalism, often at the expense of the working class, rather than ill-defined 'fairness', has been and remains the Party's fundamental goal.
Labor's material constitution
While hardly orthodox or a commonplace, the notion that Labor is a capitalist workers party is not new. Australian socialist W. R. Winspeare argued, in 1915 , that capitalists could benefit from Labor's ability to attract workers' support for policies contrary to working class interests (Winspeare, 1914: 9-10, 22, 24, 37, 39, 45) . In a similar vein, Lenin characterised the ALP as a 'liberal labour party', 'the unalloyed representative of the non-socialist workers' trade unions' whose officials also led the party (Lenin, 1977: 216-17. 1) ; From this perspective, the ALP was a capitalist workers organisation. A workers party, in that it was established by the trade unions and the working class formed its most solid base of mass support. This evidently distinguished Labor from its conservative rivals. It was a capitalist party, because its project was to manage the capitalist state and economy, not to overthrow or profoundly change them. Labor was a capitalist workers party, rather than a socialist workers party because of the class interests of those who led and controlled it -the trade union leaders and parliamentarians. Trade unions are affiliated to the State and Territory Branches of the federal Labor Party. Half of the delegates to the Branches' conferences represent trade unions and union leaders play an important role in the life of the Party at all levels. These delegates generally follow the instructions of their unions' leaders. The class position of such officials is defined by their distinctive place in the relations of production in capitalist society. The purpose of unions is to improve the terms on which labour power is exploited, not to overcome exploitation itself. The job of union officials is to act as bargaining agents; to secure the best wages and conditions for workers. For them, negotiations and the union are ends in themselves, rather than means to an end. Union leaders attempt to gain benefits for workers but they also seek to moderate working class demands to levels capitalists find acceptable, even if sometimes disagreeable. As has been established since the early writings of British Fabians Sidney and Beatrice Webb, full-time trade union officials experience rather different working and life circumstances to those of their members (Webb and Webb, 1911) . They are not exploited by an employer and they lead a relatively privileged lifestyle compared to the mass of their members. In playing their negotiating role, union officials come under pressure not just from members but from employers and the state. This has clear political implications. 1) for the application of this approach to the British Labour Party, see Cliff and Gluckstein 1988. Australian political scientist Don Rawson commented in 1966, '[s] ince the work by which they will be judged consists of trying to improve conditions under the existing, capitalist system it is not surprising that union officials have usually been reformist rather than revolutionary' (Rawson, 1966: 14) .
They use their position in the ALP to further their interests as a social group, and these interests are embedded in the continued existence of capitalism.
Labor's parliamentary leaders reinforce the reformist rather than the revolutionary orientation of the Party. Like union officials, Labor politicians mediate between workers and capitalists. But they perform this function at one further remove from direct struggles at the point of production. Like union officials, their electoral work -canvassing support to win the Party's endorsement of their candidature, door-knocking at election time or speaking at public meetings -brings them into periodic contact with workers. But their normal routine does not involve relating to workers as workers: reporting to them at strike meetings or visiting workplaces to recruit to a union.
Unlike union officials, Labor politicians rarely interact with workers in forums where they may be disciplined. They are therefore even less subject to control by rank and file workers than union leaders. Further, Labor politicians, unlike union leaders, are at times called upon to run the capitalist state which makes them even more sensitive to the requirements of the capitalist class. When in office, they oversee some of the key elements of the state machine, a responsibility Labor leaders share with other senior public officials:
heads of the public service and the central bank, military chiefs, judges of the High Court and so on. 2) The dual and contradictory nature of working class consciousness is explored by Gramsci 1971, p.333; and Lukács 1970, pp.24-38. moulds this outlook to promote nationalism. As a consequence, the ALP has often been in a better position to pursue the general interests of capital, despite the opposition of individual members of the bourgeoisie or even whole sections of the capitalist class (Sharkey, 1943: 26).
Furthermore, in periods when the working class is mobilised or in an advantageous bargaining position, Labor governments may be more capable of controlling and defusing workers' militancy, thanks to their close relationship with union officials and distinctive association with the working class.
The Government of John Curtin (1941-45) , for example, was able to hold down real wages during World War II because, unlike Bob Menzies'
short-lived conservative Government (1939-41) , it enjoyed the forbearance, if not active support, of the labour movement (Sheridan, 1989 (Catley and McFarlane, 1973: 5-25) .
Take, for example, its decision to cut tariffs by 25 per cent in 1973. This was a sharp practical departure from the long-term consensus in economic policy.
Since before World War I, both Labor and the conservatives had systematically protected domestic manufacturing industry. From the 1960s, however, there was an intellectual shift, initiated by economists and particularly appreciated by capitalists in internationally competitive export industries which stood to gain immediate benefits from reduced protection. They were not only in the farming sector, traditionally the main opponent of tariff protection for manufacturing, and the rapidly expanding mining sector but also sections of manufacturing itself. They recognised that, with the increasing scale of state-of-the-art manufacturing operations and the tighter integration of the global economy, old-fashioned protectionism did not effectively promote capital accumulation any more. Decreasingly effective in helping manufacturing industries to expand, the tariff regime was also undermining the capacity of export sectors to grow. Under The Tariff Board, which advised governments about tariffs and quota policies, played an important role in the spread of a new economic orthodoxy, much more hostile to state intervention in the economy and protectionism in particular (Glazer, 1982: 91, 272-3) .
This was consistent not only with changes in the thinking of important sections of the Australian capitalist class, its advisers and the outlook of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) but also the level of integration of global capitalism.
Conservative Coalition Governments of the late 1960s and early 1970s
were hamstrung in their ability to carry through a significant change from import-substitution industrialisation to a more export-oriented approach.
Made up of parties integrally involved with the affairs of the capitalist class and therefore riven by the same divisions as the capitalist class itself, the Coalition could not distance itself sufficiently from the sections of capital which would feel the most pain from a sharp change in tariff policy, chiefly large manufacturers geared to domestic markets. On the other hand, sections of the Labor Party and its leadership were less constrained and were increasingly critical of the usefulness of tariff protection from around 1967. 3) Whitlam and his associates claimed to be 'economically rational' compared with the conservatives. In government, from 1972, they followed advice from the OECD that Australian manufacturing needed to be roused from its tariff-induced torpor by greater international competition (Catley and McFarlane, 1974: 18) .
3) Whitlam stated that he 'owed his own conversion' on the issue to Labor left leader Jim Cairns, Murphy(1980: 33, 45 ).
The 1973 tariff cut began the practical shift away from the policy of building up industry behind protectionist barriers and was the most significant step in the transition to neo-liberal industry policy in Australia before the Hawke Government. The Whitlam Government's revaluations of the Australian dollar had similar structural and anti-inflationary logics to the tariff cut. In 1973, Whitlam confidently told a business meeting that his was 'the first genuine free enterprise government in twenty-three years' (Catley and McFarlane, 1981: 125, 233 ).
The economic policy pursued by Labor on other fronts also contributed to capitalist restructuring, in ways described by Sharkey, which reflected its character as a capitalist workers party. Minister for Minerals and Energy Rex
Connor's attempts to maximise returns to Australian capital from the country's resources exports were one such example. Connor's policy had two major thrusts. One was to improve the prices secured for exports, by intervening in negotiations between mining companies and their customers and increasing minerals exploration during the boom of 1973. High mineral royalties meant that more of the returns from higher prices flowed into government coffers. Connor also aimed to increase the proportion of the mining industry owned by Australians. His goal was to accelerate national capitalist development by expanding state regulation and ownership of the mining sector (Catley and McFarlane, 1974: 45-53 ).
Labor's efforts to restructure Australian capitalism during the Whitlam Government were indeed innovative, but they did not represent a break from
Labor's more profound traditions in economic policy. Now, as before, the Party was pursuing the interests of the Australian capitalist class. In the 1970s, as previously, it was doing so along lines approved by important currents in the economics profession and business.
The extension of the welfare state was a response to pressure from a res-tive working class, then notching up post-war strike records in the struggle for higher wages. The Whitlam Government's expansion of spending on health, education and social security clearly benefited the working class.
Medibank was a new system of universal health insurance that significantly improved the access of poorer people to health care. The fact that Medibank and some other welfare benefits and services were universal, rather than means-tested (available only to the lower paid) served workers' interests, as did the Whitlam Government's abolition of the means test on pensions for those older than seventy. The elimination of university fees in 1973 opened higher education up to working class children a little more. Expanding equal pay for women and access to childcare were likewise concessions to workers.
Nonetheless, the Whitlam Government's social program was also entirely consistent with the needs of Australian capitalism. Medibank and changes in funding for school and higher education met the need of increasingly capital-intensive production for a more literate, more skilled and healthier working class. Furthermore, as the OECD pointed out, social security policy could provide a justification for wage restraint (Catley and McFarlane, 1974: 31-3). Improved rights for women were an important way to draw more women into the workforce and relieve pressure on the immigration program. The Hawke and Keating Governments successfully promoted extensive economic rationalisation in both the private and public sectors (Castles, 1988; Kuhn, 1988: 110-6) . (Bramble, 2008: 179) .
A strike wave in 1980-81 had defeated efforts by the conservative Fraser Government to cut real wages through partial indexation. By way of contrast, the Hawke and Keating Labor Governments, thanks to their relationship with union officials, were able to engineer a major shift of national income from wages to profits without an industrial rebellion in the ranks of the unions. Industrial action fell to unprecedentedly low levels and stayed low.
By the time Labor lost office in 1996, Australian business had enjoyed more than a decade of industrial peace.
The response of the Government to unions which challenged the Accord was ruthless. In this it was also supported by the ACTU leadership and most other union officials. When Food Preservers Union members, mainly women, went on strike at the Heinz food processing factory near Melbourne in 1983, the Government sought to exclude the union from national wage increases (Bramble, 2008: 179) .
In 1985 tory, the international challenge for social democrats is to save capitalism from itself' through state intervention (Rudd, 2009: 20) .
In his 1998 maiden parliamentary speech, Rudd had rejected the notion that there was a convergence between left and right wing parties around a managerial agenda set by neo-classical economics. Invoking Keynes, he af- which 'must therefore have a central place in the management of the economy', they 'sometimes fail'. He identified 'fundamentally unstable international financial markets' as a particular concern and the need for 'industry policy'. Governments should, moreover, promote 'equality of opportunity' (Rudd, 1998) . In 2009, Rudd reiterated these points and emphasised that social democrats were committed to 'fairness for all' (Rudd, 2009: 21 (Rudd, 2006: 41) . True, Labor has tended to stress 'equality of opportunity', the conservatives 'freedom of choice'. But without substantive equality, in access to and control over resources, income and wealth, both are hollow slogans.
Shortly the Party of low corporate tax rates (Grattan, 2010: 7) .
The Rudd-Gillard Government, whether in its early months of fiscal conservatism, its later fiscally profligate incarnation or once it returned to the old-time religion of budget surpluses, was typically social democratic in its macro-economic policies. This was not because of its devotion to fairness but precisely because it was employing the same tools and analytical frameworks to deal with the economic crisis as conservative administrations, with minor differences in the degree of reliance on particular measures and limited contrasts in rhetoric (Rudd, 2009a; Rudd, 2009c) . Labor has been rather more inclined to support state intervention in the economy and a little less complacent about the alleged benefits of the market. Rudd, for example, argued in 2009 that 'extreme capitalism and unrestrained greed… have perverted so much of the global financial system' through the activities of 'predatory speculators' (Rudd, 2009a) . The fundamental cause of the global financial crisis did not lie in the logic of capitalist accumulation -that is production subordinated to profit-making -or in the material world at all, but in 'free market ideology' which had been allowed to run unchecked for In the spirit of the ALP's long-term devotion to building up strategic industries through state action, the Government adopted a 'car plan' which, under the cover of environmental concerns and combating the economic crisis, proposed $6.2 billion of public subsidies to the industry by 2020. The rules of tariff exemption schemes were, furthermore, tightened to promote Australian industry (Rudd and Carr, 2008) . On the other hand, despite pressure from the ACTU and manufacturing unions, the Rudd Government did not introduce preference for Australian companies in public procurement contracts. In April 2009, the Rudd Government announced that the federal government would initiate and own initially a new National Broadband
Network to be constructed as a public-private partnership arrangement at an estimated cost of $43 billion (Rudd, 2009b) . By overcoming the problems 
